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Abstract. At EUROCRYPT 2011, Gentry and Halevi implemented a
variant of Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme. The core part
in their key generation is to generate an odd-determinant ideal lattice
having a particular type of Hermite Normal Form. However, they did
not give a rigorous proof for the correctness. We present a better key
generation algorithm, improving their algorithm from two aspects.
– We show how to deterministically generate ideal lattices with odd
determinant, thus increasing the success probability close to 1.
– We give a rigorous proof for the correctness. To be more specific,
we present a simpler condition for checking whether the ideal lattice
has the desired Hermite Normal Form. Furthermore, our condition
can be checked more efficiently.
As a result, our key generation is about 1.5 times faster. We also give ex-
perimental results supporting our claims. Our optimizations are based on
the properties of ideal lattices, which might be of independent interests.
Keywords: fully homomorphic encryption, key generation, Hermite Normal
Form, ideal lattice
1 Introduction
Fully homomorphic encryptions (FHE) support arbitrary operations on encrypted
data which have a wide range of applications such as private information retrieval[1],
electronic watermark[2]. Ever since the introduction of the concept of FHE by
Rivest et al [12], there have appeared many homomorphic encryption schemes
which support limited operations[3, 13]. Nevertheless, all these schemes failed to
be FHE.
It was not until 2009 that Gentry [7] proposed the first plausible FHE scheme
using ideal lattice. Since then, researchers proposed many FHE schemes [4, 5, 9].
Nowadays, all existing FHE schemes follow Gentry’s blueprint. Specifically, one
first constructs a “somewhat homomorphic” scheme that supports some limited
operations on the encrypted data. Then he “squashes” the decryption procedure
so that it can be expressed as operations supported by the scheme. Finally,
he converts the “somewhat homomorphic” scheme into a fully homomorphic
scheme. The low efficiency of FHE is one of the main obstacles that prevents it
from being practical.
The first attempt to implement Gentry’s FHE scheme was made by Smart
and Vercauteren[15] in 2010. They gave an optimized version of Gentry’s scheme,
which decreased the key size by a linear factor. However, they needed to generate
ideal lattices with prime determinant during the key generation. In practice,
one may need to try as many as n1.5 candidates before finding one with prime
determinant when working with lattices in dimension n. As a result, they failed
to implement Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
In 2011, Gentry and Halevi[8] first completely implemented Gentry’s fully
homomorphic encryption scheme continuing in the same direction of the imple-
mentation of [15]. The strong requirement that the lattice has a prime determi-
nant was removed. Instead, they only required that the determinant is odd and
the lattice has a simple-HNF (see Definition 2). They found in practice that the
success probability was roughly 0.5. Thus one needs to try two candidates on
average to get a valid key. Moreover, they proposed a method to check whether
a lattice has a simple-HNF. However, they did not provide a rigorous proof for
the correctness of their algorithm and some details on their implementation were
not very clear.
Gentry-Halevi’s implementation depends heavily on the underlying alge-
braic structure of the scheme, that is, the 2-power cyclotomic fields. Scholl and
Smart[16] showed how to generalize the fast key generation techniques to arbi-
trary cyclotomic fields. They also obtained a key generation algorithm which is
roughly twice faster.
Our Contribution By studying the properties of ideal lattices, we present
further improvements on the key generation algorithm in [8]. Our algorithm has
a rigorous proof for correctness and is about 1.5 times faster in practice. Our
focus is on Gentry-Halevi’s original implementation, which is different from [16].
As stated before, the core idea in the key generation algorithm of [8] is to
generate an odd-determinant ideal lattice, which has a simple-HNF.
In order to generate ideal lattice with odd determinant, the authors of [8]
chose a random generator and computed the determinant of the generated ideal
lattice. Since the ideal lattice under consideration is highly structured and we
only care about the parity of the determinant, it might be possible to determine
whether the determinant is odd without computing it. In fact, we do find that
the parity of the determinant is connected to the generator in a very simple
way. Thus we can generate odd-determinant ideal lattice deterministically by
imposing a simple constraint on the generator.
To check whether the ideal lattice has the desired HNF, they gave a simple
checking condition, which avoided computing the HNF explicitly out of the con-
sideration of efficiency. By studying and exploiting the properties of the HNF
of ideal lattice, we are able to present another checking condition. By verifying
that our condition holds, we can rigorously prove that our algorithm outputs an
ideal lattice with the desired HNF. Furthermore, our condition can be checked
more efficiently.
We need to point out that our improvements are of more theoretical than
practical significance due to the following reasons. First, Gentry and Halevi’s
implementation is the very first one, and there are much better implementations
of different schemes [14, 17, 18, 19]. Besides, key generation is not a bottleneck of
FHE schemes and the algorithm in [8] is very fast even for very large parameters,
which makes our slight speedup less significant.
Nevertheless, it is important to make things more clear. Besides, our improve-
ments are based on some new, special properties of the HNF of ideal lattices,
which we believe are of independent interests.
Roadmap The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some preliminaries
are presented. In Section 3, we revisit the key generation algorithms in previous
implementations. In Section 4, we propose our optimized key generation for
Gentry’s FHE scheme, together with some theoretical analyses and experimental
results. A brief conclusion will be given in the final section.
2 Preliminaries
Notations We use bold capital and lowercase letters to denote matrices and
vectors respectively. For a matrix M ∈ Rn×m, the i-th row is denoted as Mi
and the entry in (i, j)-th entry is denoted as mi,j . For a vector x ∈ R
n, the i-th
entry is denoted as xi. These notations are used throughout the paper unless
specified otherwise.
2.1 Hermite Normal Form
For integer matrices, there is a very important standard form known as the
Hermite Normal Form.
Definition 1 (Hermite Normal Form). A nonsingular matrix H ∈ Zn×n is
said to be in HNF, if
– hi,i > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
– hj,i = 0 for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n.
– 0 ≤ hj,i < hi,i for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
For “randomly” generated matrices of high dimensions, the diagonals of its HNF
are highly unbalanced: most of them are small (in fact most of them are 1), and
the first diagonal is usually the only large one. We can define a very special HNF.
Definition 2 (Simple-HNF). A nonsingular matrix H ∈ Zn×n is said to be
in simple-HNF if it is in HNF and hi,i = 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
It has been shown that asymptotically the density of “simple-HNF” for randomly
generated n × n matrices (in the sense that each entry is chosen uniformly at
random from {−M,−M+1, · · · ,M} for large enoughM) is 1∏n
j=2
ζ(j) ≈ 44%[10,
11], where ζ(j) is the Riemann zeta function.
2.2 Lattice
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of Rm. Formally,
Definition 3 (Lattice). Given n linearly independent vectors B = {b1, b2, · · · , bn},
where bi ∈ R
m, the lattice L(B) generated by B is defined as following
L(B) = {
n∑
i=1
xibi : xi ∈ Z} = {xB : x ∈ Z
n}.
We call B a basis of L(B), m and n the dimension and the rank of L(B)
respectively. When m = n, we say L(B) is full-rank.
Definition 4 (Determinant). For lattice L(B), the determinant is defined as
det(L) =
√
det(BBT ).
When L(B) is full-rank, B is nonsingular and det(L) = | det(B)|.
Definition 5 (Primitive Lattice Vector). A lattice vector v ∈ L is called a
primitive lattice vector if for any integer k > 1, v/k /∈ L.
There is an easy criterion for determining whether a lattice vector is primitive.
Proposition 1. Given a lattice L with basis B, v = xB ∈ L is primitive if and
only if gcd(x1, · · · , xn) = 1.
2.3 Ideal Lattice
In what follows, we focus on R = Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉, where f(x) ∈ Z[x] is a monic
polynomial of degree n and 〈f(x)〉 is the ideal generated by f(x) in Z[x].
Consider the coefficient embedding
σ : R→ Zn,
n−1∑
i=0
aix
i 7→ (a0, a1, · · · , an−1).
For any polynomial v(x) ∈ R, we use v to denote the image of v(x) under σ,
and consider them equivalent.
Let g(x) be a polynomial of degree < n and v(x) ∈ 〈g(x)〉, then there exists
a polynomial w(x) ∈ Z[x] of degree < n such that v(x) = w(x)g(x) mod f(x).
Write w(x) = wn−1x
n−1+· · ·+w1x+w0, then v(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 wix
ig(x) mod f(x).
So each element in 〈g(x)〉 is a linear combination of g(x) mod f(x), xg(x)
mod f(x), · · · , xn−1g(x) mod f(x). It follows that 〈g(x)〉 is a lattice under
the coefficient embedding. Thus, we can define
Definition 6 (Ideal Lattice). For g(x) ∈ R = Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉, where f(x) ∈ Z[x]
is a monic polynomial of degree n, the ideal generated by g(x) forms a lattice L
under the coefficient embedding. We call L the ideal lattice generated by g(x).
Moreover, if g(x) and f(x) are coprime over Q (hence over Z since f(x) is
monic), g(x) mod f(x), xg(x) mod f(x), · · · , xn−1g(x) mod f(x) are linearly
independent. Otherwise there exist integers y0, y1, · · · , yn−1 not all zero, such
that
∑n−1
i=0 yix
ig(x) mod f(x) = 0, that is, (
∑n−1
i=0 yix
i)g(x) = 0 mod f(x),
which indicates that g(x) and f(x) are not coprime. Therefore, the ideal lattice
generated by g(x) is full-rank.
2.4 Resultant
The resultant of two polynomials is defined as
Definition 7 (Resultant). Let a(x) = amx
m + · · ·+ a1x+ a0, b(x) = bnx
n +
· · ·+ b1x+ b0 ∈ R[x]. Define the Sylvester matrix of a(x) and b(x) as
Sylv(a(x), b(x)) =


a(x)
...
xn−1a(x)
b(x)
...
xm−1b(x)


=


a0 a1 · · · am
a0 a1 · · · am
. . .
. . .
a0 a1 · · · am
b0 · · · bn
. . .
. . .
b0 · · · bn


(n+m)×(n+m)
.
Then the resultant of a(x) and b(x), denoted as Res(a, b), is the determinant of
Sylv(a(x), b(x)).
3 Key Generation Algorithms of Gentry’s FHE Scheme
In this section we revisit the key generation algorithms implementing Gentry’s
fully homomorphic encryption scheme in [15, 8].
3.1 The Smart-Vercauteren’s Key Generation
Smart and Vercauteren [15] first attempted to implement Gentry’s FHE schemes.
For the key generation, they fixed a monic irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x] of
degree n. Then they repeatedly chose another polynomial g(x) randomly from
some set until the resultant of f(x) and g(x) was prime. They showed that the
HNF of such ideal lattice had the following simple-HNF.


d 0 0 0
[−r]d 1 0 0
[−r2]d 0 1 0
. . .
[−rn−1]d 0 0 1


.
where [x]d = x mod d. Such lattices can be represented implicitly by two
integers d and r, thus the key size is reduced by a factor of n.
However, they failed to implement the FHE scheme since they were unable
to generate keys for lattice of dimension n > 2048. One of the main obstacles lies
in the inefficiency of generating ideal lattices with prime determinant by trial
and error.
3.2 The Gentry-Halevi’s Key Generation
In [8], Gentry and Halevi found that it was not necessary for the determinant
to be prime. Instead, they showed that the scheme can go through as long as
the ideal lattice has an odd determinant and a simple-HNF. The key generation
consists of the following steps.
(i) Fix f(x) = xn + 1 with n a power of 2. Then they choose a vector v =
(v0, · · · , vn−1), where each entry vi is chosen at random as a t-bit integer.
Consider the ideal lattice generated by v(x) = vn−1x
n−1 + · · ·+ v1x+ v0 in
Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉. Then the lattice is generated by the following basis
V =


v0 v1 v2 vn−1
−vn−1 v0 v1 vn−2
−vn−2 −vn−1 v0 vn−3
. . .
−v1 −v2 −v3 v0


.
(ii) Given v(x) and f(x), use their highly optimized algorithm to compute the
resultant d of v(x) and f(x) and the constant term w0 of w(x), where w(x) =
wn−1x
n−1 + · · ·+w1x+ w0 is the unique polynomial such that v(x)w(x) =
d mod f(x). If d is odd, compute w1 by applying their highly optimized
algorithm to (xv(x) mod f(x)) and f(x).
(iii) If gcd(w1, d) = 1, compute r =
w0
w1
mod d, check whether rn = −1 mod d.
If so, they consider that the ideal lattice has the desired HNF, then they
compute an odd coefficient wi via wi = rwi+1 mod d and w0, w1 (The
subscripts are modulo n.) and use (d, r) as the public key and wi the secret
key.
For the sake of clarity and comparison, the key generation algorithm is sum-
marized in Algorithm 1. We need to emphasize that there are some details miss-
ing in their description (Lines 3-5 and Lines 7-9 in Algorithm 1) and Algorithm
1 is adopted from their source code.
3.3 Remarks on Gentry-Halevi’s Key Generation
The authors of [8] solved the main issues that prevented the key generation in [15]
from being practical. They also gave many optimizations focusing on practical
performance. However, we note that there are several natural questions regarding
to their implementation.
Algorithm 1: Key Generation in [8]
Input: dimension n, bit length t.
Output: pk=(d, r), sk=wi.
1 Choose a random n-dimensional vector v, where each vi is a t-bit integer.
2 Compute the resultant d of v(x) and f(x), and the constant term w0 of w(x),
where w(x)v(x) = d mod f(x).
3 if d is even then
4 Go to 1.
5 end
6 Compute the coefficient w1 of w(x).
7 if w1 has no inverse modulo d then
8 Go to 1.
9 end
10 Compute r = w0
w1
mod d.
11 if rn 6= −1 mod d then
12 Go to 1.
13 else
14 Compute an odd wi via wi = rwi+1 mod d and w0, w1. (The subscripts are
modulo n.)
15 Output: pk=(d, r), sk=wi.
16 end
1. In [8], the authors mentioned that “it was observed by Nigel Smart that the
HNF has the correct form whenever the determinant is odd and square-free.
Indeed, in our tests this condition was met with probability roughly 0.5...”
Since the determinants in the experiments are numbers with millions of bits,
it is difficult to determine whether they are square-free or not. We believe
that “this condition” means “the HNF has the correct form” rather than
“the determinant is odd and square-free”. We also rerun the experiment to
confirm our assertion.
2. In step (iii), they did not mention what to do if gcd(w1, d) 6= 1. Generally,
there are two options. We can start over by choosing another lattice, or we
can compute another random coefficient of w(x) until we find one that is
coprime to d. (Judging from their code, they did the former.) In fact, we will
show if gcd(w1, d) 6= 1, then all the coefficients of w(x) are not coprime to
d. That means the latter is not optional.
3. Also in step (iii), when gcd(w1, d) = 1, we compute r, and check if r
n =
−1 mod d holds. Even if this equality held, they did not show that the
HNF has the desired form. In other words, they did not provide a proof
for the correctness of their algorithm. They did mention to check a serial
of conditions that could guarantee the HNF is simple, however, in their
implementation they actually tested only the last condition. It is vital for
the FHE scheme to work correctly. We will give a simpler condition and by
checking our condition holds, we can guarantee the HNF is indeed simple.
4 Improved Key Generation for Gentry’s FHE Scheme
In this section, we present our improved key generation algorithm for Gentry’s
FHE scheme. Our improvements consist of two aspects:
– we can generate ideal lattices with odd determinant deterministically.
– we present a rigorous proof for the correctness of our algorithm by checking
a simpler sufficient and necessary condition for the ideal lattice having a
simple-HNF.
Before presenting our key generation algorithm, we first give some useful
lemmas and propositions on ideal lattices.
4.1 Some Properties of Ideal Lattices
The following lemma was already stated without proof in [8].
Lemma 1. Let L be the ideal lattice generated by g(x) ∈ R = Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉,
where f(x) is a monic polynomial of degree n and g(x) is of degree m. Assume
g(x) is relatively prime to f(x), then det(L) = |Res(g, f)| = |Res(f, g)|.
Proof. Note that
Sylv(g(x), f(x)) =


g(x)
...
xn−1g(x)
f(x)
...
xm−1f(x)


=


g0 g1 · · · gm
g0 g1 · · · gm
. . .
. . .
g0 g1 · · · gm
f0 · · · fn
. . .
. . .
f0 · · · fn


.
Since fn = 1, the Sylvester matrix can always be transformed unimodularly into
the following (block-triangular) form by adding proper multiples of rows in the
lower half to each row on the top half,


Bn×n 0
f0 · · · fn
. . .
. . .
f0 · · · fn

 =


g(x) mod f(x)
...
xn−1g(x) mod f(x)
f(x)
...
xm−1f(x)


.
It follows that Res(g, f) = fmn det(B) = det(B).
Since g(x) is relatively prime to f(x), L is a full-rank lattice with basis B.
Therefore, det(L) = | det(B)| = |Res(g, f)| = |Res(f, g)|. ⊓⊔
The next lemma shows that the HNF of an ideal lattice has a very special
structure.
Lemma 2. Let L be the ideal lattice generated by g(x) ∈ R = Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉,
where f(x) is a monic polynomial of degree n and is relatively prime to g(x).
Then the Hermite Normal Form of L
H =


h1,1
h2,1 h2,2
...
...
. . .
hn,1 hn,2 · · · hn,n


satisfies hi,i|hj,l, for 1 ≤ l ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on i.
For i = 1, it is trivial.
For i = 2, consider the first row, which corresponds to the constant polynomial
h1,1. Since L is an ideal lattice, the vector (0, h1,1, 0 · · · , 0), which corresponds
to the polynomial h1,1x, is also in L.
It’s obvious that (0, h1,1, 0 · · · , 0) = x1H1 + x2H2 for some x1, x2 ∈ Z. Then
h1,1 = x2h2,2, x1h1,1 + x2h2,1 = 0. Hence h2,2|h1,1, h2,2|h2,1, which completes
the proof for i = 2.
Assume the result holds for i ≤ k ≤ n− 1, hi,i|hj,l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ j ≤ i ≤ k.
We show that for i = k + 1, hk+1,k+1|hj,l.
Consider the k-th row. The corresponding polynomial of k-th row is
hk,kx
k−1 + hk,k−1x
k−2 + · · ·+ hk,2x+ hk,1.
After multiplying x, we get a vector (0, hk,1, · · · , hk,k, 0, · · · , 0), which is a linear
combination of H1, · · · ,Hk+1 with integer coefficients, i.e.
(0, hk,1, · · · , hk,k, 0, · · · , 0)=
∑k+1
i=1 yiHi,
where yi ∈ Z, for i = 1, · · · , k + 1.
So 

hk,k = yk+1hk+1,k+1
hk,k−1 = ykhk,k + yk+1hk+1,k
...
hk,1 =
∑k+1
i=2 yihi,2
0 =
∑k+1
i=1 yihi,1
. (1)
From the first equation, we get yk+1 =
hk,k
hk+1,k+1
and


hk+1,k =
hk,k−1−ykhk,k
hk,k
hk+1,k+1
hk+1,k−1 =
hk,k−2−yk−1hk−1,k−1−ykhk,k−1
hk,k
hk+1,k+1
...
hk+1,2 =
hk,1−
∑k
i=2
yihi,2
hk,k
hk+1,k+1
hk+1,1 =
−
∑
k
i=1
yihi,1
hk,k
hk+1,k+1
.
From the induction hypothesis, we have hk,k|hj,l for 1 ≤ l ≤ j ≤ k ≤ n.
So the coefficient of hk+1,k+1 in each equation is in fact an integer, therefore
hk+1,k+1|hk+1,l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k + 1. Since hk+1,k+1|hk,k, we know hk+1,k+1|hj,l,
where 1 ≤ l ≤ j ≤ k + 1 ≤ n. Thus, the result holds for i = k + 1.
By the principle of induction, the lemma follows. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. A part of the result has already been proven in [6] for identifying
ideal lattices. In fact, they proved that the diagonal entries of an HNF form
a division chain, that is, hn,n| · · · |h2,2|h1,1. Our results show that off-diagonal
entries are also divisible by the corresponding diagonal entry in the same row,
which means the primitive part of the polynomial1 corresponding to each row is
monic.
Remark 2. For the HNF of a full-rank lattice, the first row is the primitive lattice
vector of the form (d, 0, · · · , 0), where d > 0 is a factor of the determinant.
In the case of ideal lattice, the first row corresponds to the smallest positive
constant polynomial in the ideal. This characterization will be useful for proving
Proposition 3.
Lemma 3. Let the notations be the same as in Lemma 2 and let Hi(x) denote
the corresponding polynomial of i-th row in the HNF, i ≤ n. Let β be the root of
h2,1 + h2,2x. Then Hi(β) =0 mod
h1,1hi,i
h2,2
, ∀i ≥ 2 and f(β) = 0 mod
h1,1
h2,2
.
Proof. We prove the first equality by induction on i.
For i = 2, by the definition of β, H2(β) = 0 mod h1,1.
Assume Hi(β) = 0 mod
h1,1hi,i
h2,2
, for i ≤ k, where 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. From
Equation 1, we have


hk,kx
k = yk+1hk+1,k+1x
k
hk,k−1x
k−1 = ykhk,kx
k−1 + yk+1hk+1,kx
k−1
...
hk,1x =
∑k+1
i=2 yihi,2x
0 =
∑k+1
i=1 yihi,1
.
Sum the equations up,
yk+1Hk+1(x) + ykHk(x) + yk−1Hk−1(x) + · · ·+ y1H1(x) = xHk(x),
Set x = β,
yk+1Hk+1(β) + (yk − β)Hk(β) + yk−1Hk−1(β) + · · ·+ y1H1(β) = 0.
Note that H1(x) = h1,1, H1(β) = 0 mod
h1,1hk,k
h2,2
. By induction hypothesis,
Hi(β) = 0 mod
h1,1hi,i
h2,2
and
h1,1hi+1,i+1
h2,2
|
h1,1hi,i
h2,2
, yk+1Hk+1(β) = 0 mod
h1,1hk,k
h2,2
.
1 The primitive part of an integer polynomial s(x) is s(x)/r, where r is the g.c.d of
the coefficients of s(x).
Since yk+1 =
hk,k
hk+1,k+1
, we have
Hk+1(β) = 0 mod
h1,1hk+1,k+1
h2,2
.
Therefore for i = k+1, the equality also holds. Thus Hi(β) =0 mod
h1,1hi,i
h2,2
,
∀i ≥ 2.
For the second equality, note that xHn(x) mod f(x) = xHn(x) − hn,nf(x).
Since the vector corresponding to xHn(x) − hn,nf(x) is a lattice vector, there
exist integers z1 · · · zn ∈ Z, xHn(x) − hn,nf(x) =
∑n
i=1 ziHi(x).
Set x = β,
βHn(β) − hn,nf(β) =
n∑
i=1
ziHi(β).
Since hn,n|hi,i for all i, Hi(β) =0 mod
h1,1hn,n
h2,2
, ∀i ≥ 2. Also H1(β) =0
mod
h1,1hn,n
h2,2
. Then hn,nf(β) = 0 mod
h1,1hn,n
h2,2
and
f(β) = 0 mod
h1,1
h2,2
.
⊓⊔
4.2 Generating Ideal Lattice with Odd Determinant
Deterministically
The key generation algorithm in [8] needs to generate an ideal lattice with odd
determinant. The original paper achieved this by trial and error. We first show
that the parity of the determinant is related to the generator in a very simple
way, and then give a deterministic way to generate an ideal lattice with odd
determinant.
In the next two subsections, we fix f(x) = xn + 1 with n a power of 2.
Proposition 2. Let L be the ideal lattice generated by v(x) = vn−1x
n−1+ · · ·+
v1x+ v0 in Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉. Then det(L) ≡ v0 + v1 + · · ·+ vn−1 mod 2.
Proof. Since we only concern the parity of the determinant, we work over F2.
Denote
P =


0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
. . .
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0


.
Then
V =


v0 v1 v2 vn−1
−vn−1 v0 v1 vn−2
−vn−2 −vn−1 v0 vn−3
. . .
−v1 −v2 −v3 v0


= v0I + · · ·+ vn−1P
n−1 = v(P ) over F2.
Now we compute the eigenvalues of P .
Since P is a cyclic shift matrix, P n = I. Note that xn + 1 = (x + 1)n over
F2 (n is a power of 2), then all the eigenvalues of P are 1. All the eigenvalues of
V are thus v(1) = v0 + v1 + · · ·+ vn−1. Hence,
det(L) ≡ (v0 + v1 + · · ·+ vn−1)
n ≡ v0 + v1 + · · ·+ vn−1 mod 2.
⊓⊔
From the above proposition, we know how to generate ideal lattices with odd
determinant deterministically. Specifically, we choose a random n-dimensional
vector v from the set
{v(x) ∈ Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉 : vi is a random t-bit integer and
n−1∑
i=0
vi ≡ 1 mod 2}.
This can be done by choosing vi randomly, and use v(x) + (v(1) + 1 mod 2) as
the generator or simply use 2u(x) + 1, where u(x) is a random vector. Then the
generated ideal lattice has an odd determinant.
4.3 A Simpler Condition for Checking the HNF
In this part, we give a simpler condition, which yields a rigorous proof for the
correctness of our algorithm. Our condition is based on the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let L be the ideal lattice generated by v(x) in Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉.
Suppose w(x) ∈ Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉 is a polynomial such that v(x)w(x) = d mod f(x)
where d is the determinant of L. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
(1) L has a simple-HNF.
(2) L contains a vector of the form r = (−r, 1, 0, · · · , 0).
(3) There exists an index i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, gcd(wi, d) = 1.
(4) For arbitrary 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, gcd(wi, d) = 1.
Proof.
(1)⇔(2) The equivalence between the two conditions was proved in [8].
(2)⇒(3) Assuming first that r = (−r, 1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ L. Then there exists y(x) ∈
Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉, such that y(x)v(x) = r(x) mod f(x). Therefore,
y(x)v(x)w(x) = r(x)w(x) mod f(x).
dy(x) = r(x)w(x) mod f(x).
Note that f(x) = xn + 1, we have
(−wn−1, · · · , wn−3, wn−2)− r(w0, · · · , wn−2, wn−1) = 0 mod d.
So w0r = −wn−1 mod d and wi+1r = wi mod d, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 2.
We prove by contradiction that ∃ 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, gcd(wi, d) = 1.
If for arbitrary 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, gcd(wi, d) 6= 1, let µ = gcd(w0, d) > 1. From
the relations among the wi’s, we know µ divides all the wi’s. Therefore,
µ| gcd(w0, · · · , wn−1, d). Hence
d
µ
= w(x)
µ
v(x) mod f(x) is a lattice vector,
which means the first diagonal of the HNF is a proper factor of d. So the
second diagonal can’t be 1, otherwise the determinant is d
µ
rather than d.
This is a contradiction. Therefore ∃ 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, gcd(wi, d) = 1.
(3)⇒(4) Assume ∃ 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1, gcd(wi, d) = 1, fix i. We also prove by contradiction.
Suppose there exists a 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 such that µ = gcd(wj , d) > 1.
Due to Lemma 2, we can assume the second row of HNF is (−αr, α, 0, · · · , 0),
for some α ∈ N+. Then α2|αh1,1|d and gcd(α,wi) = 1. Similar to previous
proof,
α(−wn−1, · · · , wn−3, wn−2)− αr(w0, · · · , wn−2, wn−1) = 0 mod d.
Hence
(−wn−1, · · · , wn−3, wn−2)− r(w0, · · · , wn−2, wn−1) = 0 mod
d
α
.
According to the steps above, wi+1r = wi mod
d
α
, for i ≤ n − 2 and
w0r = −wn−1 mod
d
α
. Since α2|d, d
α
and d share exactly the same prime
factors, hence gcd(wj ,
d
α
) = µ′ > 1 . Similar to the previous proof, we have
µ′ divides all the coefficients of w(x). Specifically, µ′|wi. Hence µ
′| gcd(wi, d),
a contradiction. Thus gcd(wi, d) = 1 for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
(4)⇒(2) Assume for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1, gcd(wi, d) = 1. Since d = w(x)v(x) mod f(x),
gcd(w0, · · · , wn−1)|d. Hence gcd(w0, · · · , wn−1) = 1. Then (d, 0, · · · , 0) is
a primitive lattice vector in L. According to Remark 2, it’s the first row
of the HNF of L, which means all the other diagonals in the HNF are 1.
Thus, L contains a vector (the second row of its HNF) of the form r =
(−r, 1, 0, · · · , 0).
⊓⊔
From the above proposition, we can conclude that in order to check whether
the ideal lattice has a simple-HNF, we only need to compute a wi and gcd(wi, d),
which is simpler and more efficient to check. If gcd(wi, d) = 1, then from the
proposition, the lattice has a simple-HNF. Otherwise, the lattice does not have
a simple-HNF.
In what follows, we show that once w1 has an inverse modulo d, it must hold
that rn = −1 mod d. Thus the checking can be safely left out.
Proposition 4. Let L be the ideal lattice generated by v(x) in Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉.
Suppose w(x) ∈ Z[x]/ 〈f(x)〉 is a polynomial such that v(x)w(x) = d mod f(x)
where d is the determinant of L. Assume that gcd(w1, d) = 1 and r =
w0
w1
mod d,
then rn = −1 mod d.
Proof. From the assumptions and the proof for Proposition 3, we know that
(−r, 1, 0, · · · , 0) is in L. According to Lemma 3, r is a root of f(x) = 0 mod d.
Therefore rn = −1 mod d. ⊓⊔
4.4 Our Key Generation Algorithm
We formally present our improved key generation algorithm (Algorithm 2) and
give some theoretical analyses and experimental results supporting our claims
in this section.
Algorithm 2: Our Key Generation Algorithm
Input: dimension n, bit length t.
Output: pk=(d, r), sk=wi.
1 Choose a random vector v from
{v(x) =
∑
n−1
i=0
vix
i : vi is a random t-bit integer and
∑
n−1
i=0
vi ≡ 1 mod 2}.
2 Compute the resultant d of v(x) and f(x), and coefficient w1 of the linear term
of w(x), where w(x)v(x) = d mod f(x).
3 if gcd(w1, d) 6= 1 then
4 Go to 1.
5 else
6 Compute w0 and r =
w0
w1
mod d.
7 Compute an odd wi via wi = rwi+1 mod d and w0, w1. (The subscripts are
modulo n.)
8 Output: pk=(d, r), sk=wi.
9 end
Theoretical Analyses We first give time estimations for both algorithms. Here
we show a few notations to represent the time for different routines.
– Tres : time to compute the resultant and wi using the algorithm in [8]. Note
that in both algorithms, we sometimes only need to compute the resultant
or a single coefficient wi, this will also take time Tres since the exactly same
routine is used to achieve these goals.
– Txgcd : time to apply the extended Euclidean algorithm.
– Tpmod : time to compute r
n mod d.
– Tmul : time to do one multiplication modulo d.
– Toddcoe : time to compute an odd coefficient of w(x) (line 14 in Algorithm 1
and line 7 in our algorithm).
For Algorithm 1, since the probability of choosing an odd-determinant ideal
lattice is 0.5, we need to try twice on average to get an odd-determinant ideal
lattice, which costs time 2Tres in order to compute the determinants. At the same
time, we have also computed a coefficient w0. Afterwards, we need to compute
another coefficient w1, which costs time Tres. From the experiment, we found
that the probability of an odd-determinant ideal lattice having simple-HNF is
very high, we simply omit the failure cases. Then computing the inverse of w1
and r takes time Txgcd and Tmul respectively, and checking if r
n = −1 mod d
takes time Tpmod. Finally we need to choose an odd coefficient of w(x), which
costs time Toddcoe. So the expected running time of Algorithm 1 is 3Tres+Txgcd+
Tpmod + Tmul + Toddcoe.
In our algorithm, the ideal lattice always has an odd determinant. As before,
we omit the failure cases where an odd-determinant ideal lattice doesn’t have
a simple-HNF, then we only need to compute two consecutive coefficients of
w(x), which costs 2Tres. Then it costs time Txgcd+Tmul to perform an extended
Euclidean algorithm and multiplication modulo d to compute r. At last the time
for choosing an odd coefficient of w(x) is Toddcoe. Thus the total time used in
our key generation algorithm is 2Tres + Txgcd+Tmul + Toddcoe.
In our experiments, we found that Tres takes most proportion of the whole
time. So on average, our algorithm is about 1.5 times faster.
Experimental Results We present our experimental results in the following.
Our experiments were performed on a PC (Intel(R) Core(TM) i7, 3.4GHz, 2G
RAM) and based on Shoup’s NTL library[14] (version 9.10.0). NTL is installed
with MPC (version 1.0.2), GMP (version 5.1.3), and MPFR (version 3.1.5).
1. We rerun the experiments of [8] to confirm our assertion in Section 3.3. We
generated 100 random ideal lattices for each parameter set, and count the num-
ber of ideal lattices in different categories. In the table, the first row are the
parameters (n, t), like (512, 380), where n is the dimension of the ideal lattice
and t is the bit length of each coefficient in the generator. “even (or odd) d” in-
dicates the generated lattice has even (or odd) determinant, and “(non-)SHNF”
indicates the lattice has (doesn’t have) a simple-HNF.
(512,380) (2048, 380) (8192,380) (32768, 380)
Alg. 1 Alg. 2 Alg. 1 Alg. 2 Alg. 1 Alg. 2 Alg. 1 Alg. 2
even d, SHNF 25 0 32 0 25 0 24 0
even d, non-SHNF 27 0 25 0 18 0 25 0
odd d, SHNF 48 98 42 98 57 100 47 90
odd d, non-SHNF 0 2 1 2 0 0 4 10
From the experiment we can see that the probability of a randomly gen-
erated ideal lattice in Algorithm 1 having the correct form (odd-determinant
and simple-HNF) is roughly 0.5 and that the failure cases is usually due to the
determinant being even.
Also, there is something interesting here. When the ideal lattices have an
even determinant, about half of them have a simple-HNF. It is not surprising if
the probability of a random ideal lattice having simple-HNF is somewhat higher
than 44% due the divisibility of the diagonal entries of its HNF. However, when
the ideal lattices have an odd determinant, most of them also have a simple-HNF.
As a result, the probability of simple-HNF is about 75%, which is much higher
than 44%. We conjecture this might has something to do with the underlying
2-power cyclotomic fields.
2. We present some experimental results on the running time of both algorithms.
In the experiments, we generated 20 valid keys and count the averaged time for
the different parts in theoretical analysis. In the next table, the “#(trials)”
column denotes the number of trials we did to get 20 valid keys. tres, txgcd,
tpmod, tmul and toddcoe are averaged time for doing the corresponding operations,
so tres ≈ 3Tres in Algorithm 1. ttotal is the averaged time to generate a valid
key. All the timings are measured in seconds.
dim n bit-size t
Gentry and Halevi’s Algorithm
#(trials) tres txgcd tpmod tmul toddcoe ttotal
512 380 37 0.171 0.048 0.054 0.007 0.003 0.284
2048 380 46 1.585 0.354 0.347 0.037 0.009 2.336
8192 380 36 12.068 2.120 2.040 0.173 0.086 16.500
32768 380 46 123.152 14.128 14.494 0.962 0.799 153.591
dim n bit-size t
Our Algorithm
#(trials) tres txgcd tmul toddcoe ttotal speedup
512 380 20 0.118 0.047 0.007 0.002 0.174 1.632x
2048 380 20 0.966 0.351 0.038 0.036 1.393 1.677x
8192 380 20 7.568 2.108 0.173 0.069 9.924 1.663x
32768 380 22 78.276 13.882 0.964 0.432 93.592 1.641x
We can see that the ratio between tres in Algorithm 1 and tres in Algorithm
2 is about 1.5, which matches the theoretical prediction (3Tres/2Tres). In two
algorithms, txgcd and tmul are almost the same and toddcoe is very short. We note
that this is because in most cases one of w0 and w1 is odd. From the experiments,
we can see that our key generation is about 1.5 (more close to 1.6) times faster.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we made improvements on the key generation of [8]. Using the
properties of ideal lattice, we present an improved key generation algorithm with
a rigorous proof for correctness. As a result, our algorithm is about 1.5 times
faster.
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